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Abstract 
This study examines earnings management behavior by US-listed commercial banks 
during the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We employ two different measures in order to study 
earnings management, the frequency of small reported net income, and the difference 
between discretionary securities gains and losses and loan loss provisions. We find 
that high-performance banks, well-capitalized banks and high-leveraged banks are to 
a great extent prone to earnings management. We also find that banks with high 
growth opportunities and banks audited by one of the Big-Four auditing companies do 
not engage in earnings management. 
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1. Introduction 
The belief that financial managers manipulate accounting earnings is widely accepted 
by users of financial statements and is supported and documented by an extensive 
literature (Schipper [1989], Subramanyam [1996], Healy and Wahlen [1999]). 
Graham et al. [2005] and Roychowdhury [2006] classify two categories of earnings 
management: 1) real earnings management through changes in cash flows, 2) accruals 
management through changing in accounting policies. Many prior studies support that 
managers use discretionary accruals and accounting changes to manage earnings 
(DeAngelo [1986, 1988], McNichols and Wilson [1988], Liberty and Zimmerman 
[1986], Moses [1987], Elliot and Shaw [1989]). For example, Healy [1985] provides 
evidence that managers use accrual policies in order to benefit from their earnings-
based bonus plans. However, distinguish earnings management from proper accrual 
accounting is not always so easy. The main goal of accrual accounting is to show to 
the viewers of a firm’s financial reports the economic performance of the firm, during 
a period, via the use of basic accounting principles (Dechow and Skinner [2000]). 
Thus, to which point managers’ accrual decisions become earnings management?  
We provide some definitions of earnings management referred in prior academic and 
professional literature. Schipper [1989], and Healey and Wahlen [1999] state that 
earnings management is a purposeful alteration of an entity’s reported economic 
performance by managers, with the intention to obtain some private gain by 
“misleading some stakeholders” or “influencing contractual outcomes” that depend on 
reported accounting numbers. A similar definition is found in Beidleman [1973], as 
well, who reports that earnings manipulation represents managers' attempts to use 
their reporting discretion to "intentionally dampen the fluctuations of their firms' 
earnings realizations". Turning to professional literature we can find a definition of 
earnings management that refer more to financial fraud: “earnings management is the 
intentional, deliberate, misstatement or omission of material facts, or accounting data, 
which is misleading and, when considered with all the information made available, 
would cause the reader to change or alter his or her judgment or decision” (National 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners [1993]). According to Kirschenheiter and 
Melumad [2002] reported earnings have dual roles. The level of reported earnings 
gives investors an idea about the level of future cash flows. The variability of reported 
earnings reduces investors' confidence in the future permanent performance. These 
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two roles cause managers to manipulate earnings. The way banks manage earnings 
differs considerably within the banking sector. Collins et al. [1995], report that bank 
homogeneity is rejected consistently for earnings management. Beatty et al. [2002] 
find that relative to private banks, public banks are more likely to use loan loss 
provisions and realized security gains and losses to eliminate small earnings 
decreases. Shrieves and Dahl [2003] report that poorly capitalized banks use the 
security gains component of earnings for improving Tier 1 capital levels by offsetting 
rising levels of provisions, more that well capitalized banks. Finally, Leuz et al. 
[2003] state that earnings management is less pronounced in common law countries 
and Handorf and Zhu [2006] suggest that banks of different sizes may have different 
earnings management practices. 
We estimate earnings management based on the frequency of small positive reported 
net income and on the difference between discretionary securities gains and losses and 
discretionary loan loss provisions. When banks use loan loss provisions properly, they 
are allowed to recognize an estimated loss on a loan when the loss becomes likely, 
before the amount of loss can be determined with precision and is actually charged 
off. That means banks can be realistic about dealing with credit problems early, when 
times are good, by develop a large stock of loan loss reserves. Later, when the loan 
losses become settled, the stock of reserves can absorb the losses without using 
capital, keeping the bank safe and able to continue extending credit. However, when 
provisioning, bank managers may use discretion in setting the appropriate 
provisioning levels. In some situations managers understate expected losses in order 
to improve reported net income in the current report. In other situations managers 
overstate losses in the current period when earnings are high so that they can 
understate losses in a later period when earnings are low (Benston and Wall [2005]). 
Thus, banks provision considerably more in good times when earnings are high and 
less in bad times when earnings are low (Kim and Santomero [1993], Laeven and 
Majnoni [2003], Bikker and Metzemakers [2004]). If actual losses exceed expected 
losses managers can draw from loan loss reserves, and if actual losses are lower than 
expected losses managers can contribute additional loan loss provisions to loan loss 
reserves, therefore they can smooth income. Loan loss provisions constitute an 
expense which increases the allowance for loan losses, and loan loss reserves is a 
contra asset to loans outstanding.  Dugan [2009] states that bank managers might use 
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loan loss reserves to manage or smooth earnings over time, and in particular, to make 
unexpected losses look less bad to investors. 
Earnings management is limited on the extent to which earnings must be reported in 
accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Statement on 
Auditing Standards (SAS) 69, The Meaning of Present Fairly In Conformity with 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, addresses the use of GAAP and fair 
presentation.  It states that “an auditor should not express an unqualified audit opinion 
if the financial statements contain a material departure from GAAP unless, due to 
unusual circumstances, adherence to GAAP would make them misleading”. GAAP 
defines the limits within which reported earnings can deviate from economic earnings. 
Since managers are restricted from over-reporting earnings by GAAP, false disclosure 
practices are effectively eliminated. However, according to Sankar and Subramanyam 
[2001] GAAP allow managerial discretion, subject to certain restrictions, in 
determining financial reporting policies. This discretion makes earnings sensitive to 
manipulation. For example, sometimes companies buy stock in other companies. 
GAAP assume that investments of less than 20% of the stock of another company are 
passive investments and, therefore, there is no reason for the share of the investee’s 
net income to be included to the investment company’s financial statements. GAAP 
provide detailed rules on the reporting of passive investments and classifies them into 
two portfolio categories, each with different accounting treatment: 1) trading 
securities
1
, 2) available for sale securities
2
. Nevertheless, GAAP requirements for 
investments offer opportunities for earnings management. When additional earnings 
are needed, managers can sell a security that has an unrealized gain. On the other 
hand, when it seems useful to report lower earnings, managers can sell a security that 
has an unrealized loss. This gain or loss will be reported in operating earnings. 
Another way to manage earnings through securities gains and losses is the change of 
holding intent. Management can reclassify a security from trading security to 
available-for-sale security and vice versa and thus, any unrealized gain or loss on a 
security will move to or from the income statement. Finally, managers can write down 
                                                 
1
 Any changes in the market value of these securities, or actual gains or losses from sales, are reported 
in operating income. 
2
 Any change in the market value is reported in “other comprehensive income components”, not in 
operating income. However, when these securities are sold, any gain or loss is reported in operating 
income. 
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securities that have an apparent decline in fair market value to the reduced value, 
regardless of their portfolio classification. 
The purpose of this study is to examine earnings management in US commercial 
banks. We use a sample of 143 listed US commercial banks for a period of eight 
years, 2003-2010. The time period has been purposefully chosen to cover the years 
that followed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), enacted in 2002. In the wake of the 
Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia etc. accounting scandals, regulators and policy makers 
have been alerted to corporate financial reporting practices and have promoted 
stronger corporate governance mechanisms to increase the quality of reported 
earnings (Vyas [2011]). The purpose of SOX, which constitutes a US federal law, is 
to increase the independence and role of a firm’s outside auditors and board of 
directors, among others, in order to enhance the quality of financial reporting. Many 
prior studies provide evidence on a decrease in accounting earnings management after 
the implementation of SOX. Cohen et al. [2004] and Zhou [2008], document that 
firms engage in less earnings management after the passage of SOX. Lobo and Zhou 
[2006] also find that firms report lower discretionary accruals after the 
implementation of SOX. However, these studies take into consideration only non-
financial firms. The research paper by Leventis and Dimitropoulos [2012] that 
examines the relationship between earnings management and corporate governance of 
commercial US banks in the post-SOX period, suggest that banking firms with 
efficient corporate governance are less prone to earnings management compared to 
the banks with weak governance.  
We contribute to the literature on earnings management in several ways. First, 
following Leventis and Dimitropoulos [2012] we examine earnings manipulation in 
the US banking industry based on two different measures of earnings management, 
the frequency of reported small positive net income and the difference between 
discretionary securities gains and losses and discretionary loan loss provisions, 
excluding the aggregate measure of corporate governance. Second, we employ a 
larger sample period compared to Leventis and Dimitropoulos [2012], spanning from 
2003 to 2010, which covers three years of the recent financial crisis. Since literature 
on the impact of the financial crisis in earnings management is very limited and focus 
only in European firms, (see Filip and Raffournier [2012], Berndt and Offenhammer 
[2010]), we provide up to date evidence on whether earnings management has been 
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affected by this crisis or not, by splitting our sample into two sub-samples and re-
estimate our models only for the period 2003-2006. Our empirical findings suggest 
that earnings management behavior based on securities gains and losses and loan loss 
provisions did not change after the financial crisis, but they also reveal a higher 
frequency of small positive reported net income, measured by SPOS, during the same 
period. Third, we additionally analyze the effect of bank size on earnings 
manipulation by splitting our sample into large and small banks and re-estimating our 
two models for each sub-group separately. The results are the same with these of the 
overall sample. 
Overall, our results show that banks with high earnings before taxes continue to 
manage earnings in the post-SOX era by both recording small positive net income and 
managing loan loss provisions and securities gains and losses. We also find that well-
capitalized and high-leveraged firms are more prone to earnings management than 
their poor-capitalized, low-leveraged counterparts. On the other hand, results suggest 
that banks with high growth opportunities do not engage in earnings management at 
all, and that banks audited by one of the Big-Four auditors avoid manipulating 
earnings by reporting small positive net income. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the most common 
earnings management techniques and a theoretical overview of the motivations for 
earnings management. Section 3 discusses the relevant literature. Section 4 explains 
the sample selection criteria, the model specifications and the limitations of the study. 
Section 5 demonstrates the empirical results of the study and the robustness tests. 
Finally, the last section provides our conclusions, implications and recommendations 
for future research.  
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2. Techniques and motivations for earnings management 
2.1 Common earnings management techniques 
There is a wide range of earnings management techniques that managers can use to 
make the actual earnings figures match past projections. We briefly discuss the three 
most common of these techniques.  
 Cookie-Jar Reserve Techniques: One of the GAAP-based accrual accounting 
requirements is that, during each accounting period, management must use 
estimates to project and record possible expenses that will be paid in the future 
as a result of events in the current fiscal year. Some types of expenses that are 
projected are bad debt write-offs, inventory write-downs and warranty costs. 
Under the cookie-jar technique, management will try to record more expenses 
in the current period. If actual expenses turn out to be lower than the estimated 
ones, the difference can be put into the cookie-jar and be used later in bad 
times when the company needs an earnings boost to meet predictions. 
 
 Big Bath Techniques: In some occasions, companies must restructure debt or 
change and close down operations and subsidiaries. When this happens, 
expenses are unavoidable and are followed by a negative effect on the 
company’s stock prices because it is associated with bad news about the 
company’s competitiveness. GAAP permits management to record an 
estimated loss for the cost inherent in the implementation of these actions, 
which is usually recorded as a nonrecurring charge against income. However, 
under the Big Bath techniques, managers estimate higher losses to prevent 
another write-down and avoid possible earnings surprises in the future. This 
improves the company’s image to the market by sending positive signals to 
investors and, thus, helps stock prices strongly rebound very quickly. 
 
 Big Bet on the Future Techniques: When a company acquires another 
company GAAP require that the acquisition must be reported as a purchase by 
the acquirer. This leaves room for earnings management through Big Bet 
techniques in two ways. Firstly, the acquirer can write-off in-process research 
and development costs from the company acquired. When these costs are 
really incurred in the future, they will not have to be reported and feature 
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earnings will be higher than they would have been otherwise. Secondly, the 
acquirer can integrate the acquired company’s earnings into corporate 
consolidated earnings and receive a boost in the current year’s earnings. 
 
2.2 Motivations for earnings management 
The literature identifies various motivations for earnings management. The most 
common incentive, referred in many prior studies, is credibility, i.e. presenting a fairly 
constant profit over the years by reducing earnings variability. Bank managers may 
attempt to positively affect investors’ perceptions of a bank by using earnings 
manipulation to send positive signals to the market about its profitability, risk and 
managerial performance (Barnea et al. [1976], Greenwald and Sinkey [1988], 
Fudenberg and Tirole, [1995]). Thus, managers, especially those of publicly traded 
banks, may strive to report a less variable income flow, which could be seen as a 
signal of good performance (Beatty and Harris [1999]). 
Banking industry is highly monitored compared to other industries, whose capital 
adequacy ratio, liquidity ratio etc. are strictly regulated. According to (Shen and Chih 
[2005]), earnings manipulation is one of the management skills that banks adopt to 
avoid violating regulations. Scholes et al. [1990] suggest that incentives for earnings 
management may arise because regulators monitor banks based on earnings. 
Regulatory constraints on capital would give bank managers an incentive to manage 
earnings over time (Handorf and Zhu [2006], Wall and Koch [2000]). For example, 
Scholes et al [1990] hypothesize that banks choose to realize gains and defer losses to 
increase their regulatory capital. 
In addition to meeting capital requirements, bank managers may potentially have 
several alternative motivations for earnings management. Rozycki [1997], reports that 
there may be tax incentives to manipulate earnings and Smith and Stultz [1985] 
suggest that income smoothing has been hypothesized to lower the present value of 
tax obligations. Before 1980 provisions were treated as a tax deductible item by the 
tax policy of the time. Bank managers may have exploited this situation to manage 
earnings by reducing tax liabilities in periods of high earnings and increasing them in 
periods of low earnings (Handorf and Zhu [2006]). Auditors may tolerate over-
reserving in good years and under-reserving in bad times, as long as banks do not 
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materially misrepresent results (Naciri [2002]). Finally, according to Cortavarria et al. 
[2000] the fact that general provisions are tax deductible in most countries is itself an 
incentive to manage earnings through provisioning. Also, according to the same 
paper, if general provisions count as regulatory capital, the incentive is stronger, 
because a shift from regulatory Tier 1 capital to general provisions lowers the tax 
burden. 
Other studies view earnings management as a means of managers to convey private 
information about future earnings (Ronen and Sadan [1981], Demski [1998], Scholes 
et al. [1990], Kirschenheiter and Melumad [2002]). For example, Sankar and 
Subramanyam [2001] demonstrate that managers, smooth earnings to smooth 
consumption and that by doing so, they reveal private information about future 
earnings. On the other hand, Goel and Thakor [2003] support that the motivation for 
earnings management is to discourage investors from acquiring private information 
that could then be used to trade against shareholders selling for liquidity reasons.  
Furthermore, earnings management can be explained by managerial self-interest. 
Share offerings provide a direct incentive to manage earnings. When bank managers 
increase reported earnings, they improve the terms on which their banks’ shares are 
sold, providing direct monetary benefits to themselves and their banks (Dechow and 
Skinner [2000]). Some compensation schemes and bonus targets of bank managers 
may also encourage earnings management (Lambert [1984], Healy [1985]). 
Moreover, bank managers may receive incumbency rents from staying with the bank, 
which encourages an earnings manipulation behavior to minimize the chance of being 
fired (Fudenberg and Tirole [1995], Arya et al. [1998]). 
 Finally, according to Trueman and Titman [1988] earnings management may be the 
result of perceived bankruptcy concerns. The allegation is that banks face a potential 
illiquidity problem and thus, are exposed to the risk of bankruptcy through 
widespread “bank runs” (Diamond and Dybvig [1983]). 
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3. Literature Review 
Earnings management has been a topic of interest in the accounting literature for 
many years now. There is a wide range of empirical research on the use of 
discretionary accruals and accounting changes to manage earnings (DeAngelo [1986, 
1988], Liberty and Zimmerman [1986], Moses [1987], Elliot and Shaw [1989]). But 
although evidence of earnings management can be found in almost every industry, it 
is generally accepted that the manipulation of earnings is more apparent in the 
banking industry (Greenawalt and Shinky [1988]). Shen and Chih [2005] studied 
earnings management of banks across 48 countries and concluded that bank earnings 
management exists for nearly all of their sample countries. Although, by using 
conventional measures they concluded that US banks show no sign of earnings 
management. Cornett et al. [2009] examined earnings management at the largest 
publicly traded bank holding companies in the US and found evidence of earnings 
smoothing. Shrieves and Dahl [2003] and Agarwal et al. [2007] examined the 
Japanese banking sector and concluded that Japanese banks utilized accounting 
discretion as a means of managing earnings during the period 1985-1999. Bhat [1996] 
found a significant association between poor financial health and banks engaging in 
excessive earnings management. By using statistical earnings management measures 
Degeorge et al. [1999], also found evidence of earnings management.  
 An extensive prior literature exists on the relationship between earnings management 
and loan loss provisions (Liu and Ryan [1995], Collins et al. [1995], Beatty et al. 
[1995], Ahmed et al. [1999], Laeven and Majnoni [2003], Bikker and Metzemakers 
[2004], Perez et al. [2006]). Greenawalt and Shinky [1988], McNichols and Wilson 
[1988] and Wahlen [1994] have also examined the earnings management among 
financial institutions in the US, focusing on loan loss provisions as the discretionary 
element. Various studies include securities gains and losses as a discretionary 
component of income, as well (Moyer [1990], Scholes et al. [1990], Collins et al. 
[1995], Beatty et al. [1995], Perez et al. [2006]). The allegation is that loan loss 
provisions and securities gains and losses are used as means of earnings management 
by managers with the purpose of reporting increased or decreased income, depending 
on the occasion, to the external audiences.  
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Earnings management is not always so easy to study because earnings depend on both 
the firm’s financial performance and the accounting system that measures it (Dechow 
et al. [2010]). Another problem could be that earnings and loan loss provisions may 
be positively related because of the optimal statistical forecasting with respect to loan 
losses and not because of the misleading discretionary provisioning that leads to 
income smoothing. Thus, sometimes, it is difficult to understand the difference 
between earnings management and prudent provisioning (Kim and Santomero 
[1993]). These could be some of the reasons why empirical evidence on the use of 
loan loss provisioning and securities gains and losses to manage earnings by banks is 
mixed. One more explanation for the conflicting empirical results could be the use of 
different sample periods (Handorf and Zhu [2006]). 
There are studies that find a positive relation between loan loss provisions and 
earnings of banking firms, which is consistent with smoothing earnings via loan loss 
provisions (Greenawalt and Shinky [1988], Liu and Ryan [1995], Beatty et al. [1995], 
Beaver and Engel [1996], Liu et al. [1997], Kim and Kross [1998], Kanagaretnam et 
al. [2004], Hazera [2005], Leventis et al. [2011]). These findings are similar to these 
of many studies that examine earnings management in US banks and conclude that 
loan loss provisions are extensively used to manipulate reported earnings (Scheiner 
[1981], McNichols and Wilson [1988], Scholes et al. [1990], Wahlen [1994], Collins 
et al. [1995], Docking et al. [1997], Healy and Wahlen [1999], Lobo and Yang 
[2001]). Handford and Zhu [2006] find that average size US banks, generally 
overstate loan loss provisions during economic expansion, and vice versa. Yasuda et 
al. [2004] provide evidence that troubled banks engage in excessive management in 
profits by, among other strategies, adjusting for provisions for bad loans. By 
examining the earnings smoothing hypothesis in the post-SOX era DeBoskey and 
Jiang [2012] find positive relationship between earnings and loan loss provisions. The 
literature is extensive for non-US banks, as well (Shrieves and Dahl [2003] and 
Agarwal et al. [2007], among others). On the other hand by focusing on the impact of 
the 1990 change in capital adequacy regulations, Ahmed et al. [1999] find no 
significant evidence that banks have used loan loss provisions to manage earnings or 
to smooth income. The same conclusion has been reached by Wetmore and Brick 
[1994] too. 
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Securities gains and losses had been proved to be an additional element of earnings 
management in many prior researches (Moyer [1990], Scholes et al. [1990], Collins et 
al. [1995], Beatty et al. [1995, 2002], Anandarajan et al. [2003, 2007], Perez et al. 
[2006], Dechow et al. [2010]). Furthermore, there are studies finding that earnings 
manipulation can be achieved by the combination of loan loss provisions and 
securities gains and losses. Research findings of Agarwal et al. [2007] reveal that 
Japanese banks on average realized gains from securities in order to offset the 
negative impact of loan loss provisions and thereby engaged in income smoothing. 
Leventis and Dimitropoulos [2011] found that banks with bad governance use more 
earnings management through a mix of discretionary loan loss provisions and 
securities gains and losses than well-governed banks do. Moreover, Shrieves and Dahl 
[2003] suggest that loan loss provisions are positively related to nondiscretionary 
earnings, security gains are negatively related to non discretionary earnings and that 
these two strongly complement each other.  
A considerable literature offer evidence on the relation between loan loss provisions 
and variability of reported earnings. The notion is that managers attempt to reduce 
earnings variability because earnings variability constitutes a key indicator of risk 
(Beaver et al. [1970]) as external interested parties of a firm’s financial performance 
are uncertain about the stability of the earnings presented, in the future. Managers can 
achieve this reduction by raising loan loss provisions in periods of high operating 
income (Ma [1988], Greenawalt and Shinky [1988]). Healy [1985] suggests that 
managers may use discretion in ways that result in higher earnings variability in order 
to manipulate earnings, through various earnings management techniques, such as 
“Big Baths”. According to Trueman and Titman [1988], income smoothing has been 
hypothesized to lower the firm’s cost of capital by reducing variability in income. 
These studies are consistent with Leuz et al. [2003], Lang et al. [2003, 2006] and Ball 
and Shivakumar [2005, 2006], who assume that firms with less earnings smoothing 
exhibit more earnings variability. Moreover, there are several studies that use the 
frequency of small positive net income as a metric to provide evidence of managing 
towards positive earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev [1997], Degeorge et al. [1999], 
Leuz et al. [2003]). These studies try to identify the high frequency of small positive 
income by employing the indicator variable SPOS, the same variable we use in our 
study. More specifically, Burgstahler and Dichev [1997] and Degeorge et al. [1999] 
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report that small reported profits are more common than small reported losses, and 
that small increases in reported earnings are more common than small declines in 
reported earnings. They interpret their findings as evidence that managers manipulate 
earnings to avoid reporting losses and earnings declines. 
Finally, accounting regulation, corporate governance and earnings management is the 
object of research in several prior studies. Dechow et al. [2010] define higher quality 
earnings as “providing more information about the features of a firm’s financial 
performance that are relevant to a specific decision maker”. The quality of reported 
earnings depends exclusively on the decisions of bank managers. Managers have 
access in internal information about the default risk inherent in a loan portfolio and, 
therefore, their judgment is necessary in estimating the loan loss provision. Investors 
and monitors can obtain all of management's information about the loan portfolio only 
after paying a prohibitively cost. Thus, bank managers can exercise discretion over 
loan loss provision (Beaver et al. [1989]). Cornett et al. [2009] examined the 
interactions between firm performance, corporate governance mechanisms, and 
earnings management and found that corporate governance is an important factor of 
earnings management in large US banks. More specifically, their results suggest that 
banks with high levels of income and capital record more loan losses and fewer 
security gains. They also found that some corporate governance mechanisms, such as 
board independence, limit earnings management, while others, such as CEO pay for 
performance, induce it. Leventis and Dimitropoulos [2011] suggest that banks with 
efficient corporate governance manipulate earnings less, when compared to their 
weak-governance counterparts. As far as accounting regulation is concerned, it is 
generally accepted that strong legal systems are associated with less earnings 
management (Burgstahler et al. [2006]). By examining the role of financial reporting 
in the Mexican banking system, Hazera et al. [2005], concluded that because of the 
weak accounting regulation, Mexican bank managers were able to delay the 
recognition of loan losses. Leventis et al. [2011] report that after the implementation 
of IFRS, earnings management through loan loss provisions, employed by risky banks 
has been considerably constrained. The same conclusion has been reached by Barth et 
al. [2008], as well. They suggest that firms applying IAS exhibit less earnings 
smoothing and less managing of earnings toward a target. Furthermore, according to 
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Cohen et al. [2004], the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act has led to a decrease 
in earnings management behavior. 
Overall, the vast majority of prior literature tends to support a positive relation 
between loan loss provisions and securities gains and losses with earnings 
management. Even though there is proof that the manipulation of earnings has 
decreased in the post SOX era, and that banks belong to a highly regulated industry, 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) allow managerial discretion, 
subject to certain restrictions, in determining financial reporting policies and 
procedures (Sankar and Subramanyam [2001]). This discretion makes earnings 
susceptible to manipulation. We examine the relation between earnings management,  
loan loss provisions and securities gains and losses, among other factors, including the 
years that followed the SOX Act implementation and three years during the financial 
crisis. Following the prior literature we expect a positive relation between them. 
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4. Data & Methodology 
4.1 Sample selection criteria 
The dataset of our study consists of US-listed commercial banks for a sample period 
of eight years, 2003-2010. We have purposefully chosen this period to cover the years 
that followed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and three years after the financial crisis 
that began in 2007. We have extracted all bank financial statement and market data by 
Thomson Financial and Worldscope databases provided by Thomson One Reuters. 
The interaction of these two data files offered an initial sample of 576 commercial 
banks with 4584 bank year observations. We have excluded 433 commercial banks 
due to incomplete financial data. We have also manually collected the auditor data 
that are not available in Thomson Financial from the annual reports and proxy 
statements of the banks. This procedure yielded a final sample of 143 US-listed 
commercial banks with 1144 bank year observations. We have processed all data 
through e-views software. 
4.2 Model Specifications 
Following the work of Leventis and Dimitropoulos [2012] we use two measures in 
order to test for earnings management. Based on Burgstahler and Dichev [1997], our 
first measure recognizes the high frequency of small positive net income as an 
indication of earnings smoothing practices. The allegation is that, in many cases, 
firms prefer to report small positive earnings than negative earnings, through 
accounting discretion (Lang et al. [2003]). For this purpose, we estimate SPOS, an 
indicator variable that is equal to 1 if net income scaled by lagged total assets is 
between 0 and 0.01 and 0 otherwise (Burgstahler and Dichev [1997], Barth et al. 
[2008]). Our measure for earnings management is the residuals from the following 
logit regression model, where SPOS is imported as the dependent variable and 
controls for size, growth, leverage, audit, and capital adequacy as independent 
variables. 
                                        (1) 
Where: 
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Control Variables: 
                                                      
                                                                                      
                                                                                  
                                                                        
                          3                  
                                                              
                                                                    
 
The use of control variables in our model is to capture the discretionary part of 
earnings management. The natural logarithm of total assets controls for the effects of 
bank size. The coefficient on the SIZE variable is expected to be negative because of 
the notion that the larger the bank the more exposed to monitoring from financial 
analysts and investors (DeBoskey and Jiang [2012]). Thus, a large bank will not risk 
its reputation for higher earnings. The price to book ratio controls for growth 
opportunities. Tucker and Zarowin [2006] suggest that because of the high analyst 
coverage large high-growth firms avoid to smooth earnings. Thus, we expect a 
negative coefficient on the PB variable. Leverage is an indicator of managerial action 
(Bliss and Flannery [2002]). Managers of high leveraged banks may choose to 
manipulate earnings in order to be consistent with regulatory requirements (Leventis 
and Dimitropoulos [2012]). So, a positive coefficient is expected on the DE variable 
that controls for leverage. We have also included the AUDIT dummy variable that 
controls for audit quality. Research on auditors as a determinant of earnings 
management suggests that higher audit quality provide greater transparency in the 
way that managers report earnings (Dechow et al. [2010]). Teoh and Wong [1993] 
limit this conclusion only for firms that are audited by the Big–Eight auditors. As a 
result we expect a negative coefficient on AUDIT. The last control variable is the 
capital position of the bank, CAR, on which we expect either a negative or a positive 
                                                 
3
 PwC stands for PricewaterhouseCoopers, EY for Ernst & Young, and Deloitte for Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu. 
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coefficient. The implication is that, the 1990 change in bank capital adequacy 
regulations, which limits the use of loan loss provisions as regulatory capital, has 
altered banks’ incentives to manage earnings through loan loss provisions. On the 
other hand, the new capital adequacy regime reduces the costs of earnings 
management, thus smoothing earnings via loan loss provisions is now less costly 
(Ahmed et al. [1999]). The year indicators have been used to capture time specific 
effects in our model. 
Following Beatty et al. [2002] and Cornett et al. [2009], we construct our second 
measure of earnings management based on discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP) 
and discretionary realized securities gains and losses (RSGL). Prior research has 
shown that bank managers are likely to manipulate earnings through loan loss 
provisions and realized securities gains and losses (Beatty et al. [1995], Ahmed et al. 
[1999]). They can report higher earnings, firstly, by understating loan loss provisions 
and secondly, by realizing more security gains or fewer security losses (Beatty et al. 
[2002]). We use the following regression model to estimate the discretionary part of 
loan loss provisions (DLLP): 
                                                                
Where: 
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Because our measure is standardized by total assets, we transform the error term and 
we define our measure of discretionary loan loss provisions as: 
                        ,  
Where: 
                                                      
                                                                                                   
 
In order to calculate the discretionary part of realized security gains and losses we 
follow again Beatty et al. [2002] and Cornett et al. [2009] and we estimate the 
following regression model: 
                                     , 
Where: 
                                                                             
                                                                      
                                                                               
                                                                          
                                                                   
                                                                         
 
Next, we define our measure for earnings management (    ) so as to reflect that the 
higher the levels of earnings management the higher the earnings and vice versa. 
Overstated loan loss provisions decrease earnings, while overstated realized security 
gains and losses increase earnings (Cornett et al. [2009]). Our measure for earnings 
management is defined as the difference between the discretionary part of loan loss 
provisions (DLLP) and the discretionary part of realized security gains and losses 
(DSGL): 
                    
23 
 
Finally, the earnings management variable (    ) is imported as the dependent 
variable in the following regression model, which has the same independent variables 
with model (1): 
                                     (2) 
We have also tested both our two models for endogeneity by using a version of the 
Hausman test (1978) proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1989). The results 
suggest no endogeneity, thus, our coefficients are not biased. 
 
4.3 Limitations 
We have extracted all bank financial statement and market data by one database, 
Thomson One Reuters. Their validity was not double-checked by using other 
databases, and generally, other sources of data. This could lead to inaccurate and 
invalid results. Additionally, the majority of the available US commercial banks 
filtered out of the initial sample due to lack of accounting data in order for the sample 
to include only banks with complete accounting and market data. This procedure 
resulted in a very small sample, which could limit the results of our research.  
As far as the independent variables are concerned, we rely to a wide range of 
measures, given the difficulty of measuring earnings management, as earnings are 
likely to be sensitive to a variety of factor unattributable to the financial reporting 
system, such as the economic environment and incentives to adopt accounting 
regulations (Barth et al. [2008]), and, thus, our models are likely to be measured with 
considerable error. To the extent that our results are consistent across a range of 
measures, we can be partly assured that at least we capture the effects of accounting 
choices, although we cannot exclude other factors.  
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5. Empirical results  
   
  Table 1 
    Descriptive statistics of sample variables over the period 2003-2010. 
Variables Mean Median Std Dev Maximum Minimum 
Panel A: descriptive statistics of earnings and earnings management variables 
EM 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.113 -0.069 
EBT 0.011 0.014 0.015 0.048 -0.138 
SPOS 0.387 0.000 0.487 1.000 0.000 
DLLP 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.037 -0.036 
DSECGL 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.118 -0.019 
 
 
0.000 
1.000 
 
Panel B: descriptive statistics of control variables 
AUDIT 0.343 0.000 0.475 1.000 
CAR 
DE 
12.43 11.72 3.843 54.37 
1.421 1.474 16.04 45.43 -534.8 
LNTA 7.343 6.854 1.793 14.63 4.494 
PB 
 
1.596 1.540 1.136 5.460 -24.73 
Panel C: descriptive statistics of variables used to get discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals 
LLP        0.008     0.003 0.011 0.110 -0.005 
ALL        0.013     0.011 0.007 0.080 0.001 
NPL        0.017     0.008  0.024 0.295 0.000 
REL        0.640     0.687 0.214 1.010  0.000 
CIL        0.242     0.201 0.161 0.877 0.000 
ICL        0.103     0.063 0.108 0.772 0.000 
SECGL        0.001     0.000 0.005 0.120       -0.019 
UNSECGL       -0.001     0.000 0.020 0.025 -0.598 
     
 
Variable Definitions: EM, earnings management measure, defined as the difference between the 
discretionary component of securities gains and losses and the discretionary component of loan loss 
provisions; EBT, earnings before taxes scaled by lagged total assets; SPOS, indicator variable that is equal 
to 1 if net income scaled by lagged total assets is between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise; DLLP, the 
discretionary part of loan loss provisions; DSECGL, the discretionary part of securities gains and losses; 
AUDIT, dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a bank is audited by KPMG, PwC, EY or Deloitte, and 0 
otherwise; CAR, ratio of beginning Tier 1 risk adjusted capital; DE, ratio of end of year total debt to end 
of year total common equity; LNTA, natural logarithm of year-end total assets; PB, ratio of price to book 
value of equity indicating growth opportunities; LLP, loan loss provisions scaled by total loans; ALLP, 
beginning balance of allowance for loan losses scaled by total loans; NPL, non-performing loans scaled 
by total loans; REL, real-estate loans scaled by total loans; CIL, commercial and industrial loans scaled by 
total loans; ICL, installment and consumer loans scaled by total loans; SECGL, realized securities gains 
and losses scaled by total loans; UNSECGL, unrealized securities gains and losses scaled by total loans.      
  
5.1 Sample statistics 
Panels A, B, and C of Table 1 present the descriptive statistics of earnings 
management variables, control variables, and variables that has been used to get 
discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals, respectively. The earnings management 
(EM) has a mean and median of zero. The mean and median of the discretionary 
components of loan loss provisions (DLLP) and securities gains and losses  
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Table 2 
   Pearson correlations of sample variables over the period 2003-2010. 
 Variables EM EBT SPOS AUDIT CAR  DE LNTA  
        
  
EBT 0.350       
SPOS 0.020 0.159      
AUDIT 0.014 0.092 -0.098     
CAR 0.189 0.086 0.070 -0.110    
DE -0.064 0.013 0.025 0.043  0.026   
LNTA 0.000 0.017 -0.050 0.032 -0.006 0.014  
PB -0.021 0.465 -0.210 0.111 -0.011 0.675 0.010 
 
 
Variable Definitions: EM, earnings management measure, defined as the difference between the 
discretionary component of securities gains and losses and the discretionary component of loan loss 
provisions; EBT, earnings before taxes scaled by lagged total assets; SPOS, indicator variable that is 
equal to 1 if net income scaled by lagged total assets is between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise; AUDIT, 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a bank is audited by KPMG, PwC, EY or Deloitte, and 0 otherwise; 
CAR, ratio of beginning Tier 1 risk adjusted capital; DE, ratio of end of year total debt to end of year 
total common equity; LNTA, natural logarithm of year-end total assets; PB, ratio of price to book value 
of equity indicating growth opportunities. 
 
 
(DSECGL) is zero, as well, by construction, suggesting that there are more banks 
reporting incoming-increasing loan loss provisions and decreasing securities gains 
and losses. The mean value of earnings before taxes (EBT) is 1.1% of total assets. The 
38.7% of the total sample banks report small positive earnings (SPOS). The ratio of 
beginning Tier 1 risk adjusted capital (CAR) has a mean of 12.43 suggesting that, on 
average, banks in the sample are well capitalized. The minimum ratio of 1 suggests 
that there are some banks that are undercapitalized. Firm asset size (LNTA) has a 
mean of 7.34, indicating our sample banks are fairly large. Real-estate loans (REL) 
are the largest loan category of our sample, representing 64% of total assets. 
5.2 Correlations 
We also examine the Pearson correlations between earnings management and control 
variables. The results are presented in Table 2. Earnings management (EM) is 
correlated to SPOS (0.020) and significantly positively correlated with earnings 
before taxes (0.35). Furthermore, the explanatory variables of earnings management 
have been tested for multicollinearity via the Variance Inflation Factor.  
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Table 3 
OLS regressions of SPOS and earnings management over the period 2003-2010. 
Dependend variables SPOS (Model 1) EM (Model 2) 
Independend variables   
C 2.456559  (1.46E-06) 0.004397 (2.80E-07) 
EBT 6.476108 (1.020246) 0.237912 (5.303885) 
AUDIT -0.221357 (-1.554949) 0.000241 (0.512745) 
CAR 0.030450 (1.763430) 0.000219 (3.225464) 
DE 0.064902 (7.000182) 5.05E-05 (2.070237) 
PB -1.272588 (-8.454289) -0.001623 (-3.332853) 
LNTA -0.042036 (-1.125644) -4.62E-05 (-0.566617) 
   
McFadden / Adjusted R-squared 0.104521 0.186937 
LR / F-statistic 159.6271 19.77108 
 
Notes: Z-statistic and t-statistic are in the parentheses of SPOS and EM, respectively. McFadden R-squared and 
LR statistic address to SPOS variable and Adjusted R-squared F-statistic address to EM variable. All of the 
coefficients have been tested in a 95% confidence interval. 
 
                                       (Regression model 1) 
                                     (Regression model 2) 
 
Variable Definitions: SPOS, indicator variable that is equal to 1 if net income scaled by lagged total assets is 
between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise; EM, earnings management measure, defined as the difference between the 
discretionary component of securities gains and losses and the discretionary component of loan loss provisions; 
EBT, earnings before taxes scaled by lagged total assets; AUDIT, dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a bank is 
audited by KPMG, PwC, EY or Deloitte, and 0 otherwise; CAR, ratio of beginning Tier 1 risk adjusted capital; 
DE, ratio of end of year total debt to end of year total common equity; LNTA, natural logarithm of year-end total 
assets; PB, ratio of price to book value of equity indicating growth opportunities. 
 
 
 
5.3 OLS regressions 
 
Table 3 presents regression results of the OLS regressions. Regression 1 uses the 
SPOS variable, the frequency of small positive earnings, as the dependent variable. 
Regression 2 uses earnings management (EM) as the dependent variable. 
From regression 1 we can see that the coefficient of earnings before taxes is positive 
and statistical significant, suggesting that the higher the performance the higher the 
frequency of small positive net income reported. AUDIT variable are negatively and 
significantly associated with SPOS. This means that the banks audited by big-four 
auditors, report small positive net income less frequently than banks audited by other 
audit firms. The same holds for large banks (-0.042036 coefficient, and statistically 
significant) and banks with high growth opportunities (-1.272588, and highly 
statistically significant). This can be explained by the fact that high growth, large 
banks are more monitored that their low growth counterparts. These results are  
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Table 4 
OLS regressions of SPOS and earnings management over the period 2003-2006, (2007-2010 excluded) 
Dependend variables SPOS (Model 1) EM (Model 2) 
Independend variables 
  
C 
11.65599 (4.721886) -0.003630 (-3.386046) 
EBT -626.7064 (-4.915538) 0.096199 (3.709415) 
AUDIT -0.306581 (-0.947171) 0.000444 (1.894387) 
CAR -0.052732 (-1.380355) 0.000238 (3.581601) 
DE -0.342237 (-2.082374) -9.86E-05 (-0.522466) 
PB -0.366916 (-1.225786) -0.000335 (-1.703949) 
LNTA -0.134530 (-1.678689) -4.66E-05 (-0.837067) 
 
  
McFadden / Adjusted R-squared 
0.577548 0.164204 
LR / F-statistic 
411.5057 13.42093 
 
Notes: Z-statistic and t-statistic are in the parentheses of SPOS and EM, respectively. McFadden R-squared and 
LR statistic address to SPOS variable and Adjusted R-squared F-statistic address to EM variable. All of the 
coefficients have been tested in a 95% confidence interval. 
 
                                       (Regression model 1) 
                                     (Regression model 2) 
 
Variable Definitions: SPOS, indicator variable that is equal to 1 if net income scaled by lagged total assets is 
between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise; EM, earnings management measure, defined as the difference between the 
discretionary component of securities gains and losses and the discretionary component of loan loss provisions; 
EBT, earnings before taxes scaled by lagged total assets; AUDIT, dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a bank is 
audited by KPMG, PwC, EY or Deloitte, and 0 otherwise; CAR, ratio of beginning Tier 1 risk adjusted capital; 
DE, ratio of end of year total debt to end of year total common equity; LNTA, natural logarithm of year-end total 
assets; PB, ratio of price to book value of equity indicating growth opportunities. 
 
 
consistent with many prior studies (Leventis and Dimitropoulos [2012], Cornett et al. 
[2009]). Finally, Tier 1 risk adjusted capital (CAR) and debt to equity ratio (DE) are 
statistically significant with positive coefficients (0.030450 and 0.064902) indicating 
that banks with high levels of capital and leverage are more prone to report small 
positive net income. All these findings are consistent with our expectations. 
Regression 2 shows the relation between earnings management (EM), defined as the 
difference between discretionary securities gains and losses (DSECGL) and 
discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP), earnings before taxes (EBT) and control 
variables. EBT has a positive (0.237912 coefficient) and statistically significant 
association (5.303885t-statistic) with earnings management indicating that banks with 
higher performance engage in higher earnings management through discretionary loan 
loss provisions and securities gains and losses. This result is consistent with Leventis 
and Dimitropoulos [2012] but inconsistent with Cornett et al. [2009]. As far as the 
control variables are concerned, the coefficient on CAR is 0.000219 and statistically  
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Table 5 
OLS regressions of SPOS and earnings management for banks with assets under $1 billion, over the period 
2003-2010. 
Dependend variables SPOS (Model 1) EM (Model 2) 
 
Independend variables   
C 1.170200 (5.20E-07) 2.348545 (0.834143) 
EBT 26.27538 (2.144736) 0.255077 (3.895728) 
AUDIT 0.311461 (0.682101) -1.64E-05 (-0.018286) 
CAR -0.042424 (-1.256158) 3.22E-06 (0.033717) 
DE 0.149393 (1.816685) 7.83E-05 (2.132097) 
PB -1.799416 (-6.845821) -0.002241 (-2.739556) 
LNTA 0.036653 (0.720136) 2.76E-05(0.296780) 
   
McFadden / Adjusted R-squared 0.123309 0.242199 
LR / F-statistic 93.19901 13.22688 
 
 
Notes: Z-statistic and t-statistic are in the parentheses of SPOS and EM, respectively. McFadden R-squared and 
LR statistic address to SPOS variable and Adjusted R-squared F-statistic address to EM variable. All of the 
coefficients have been tested in a 95% confidence interval. 
 
                                       (Regression model 1) 
                                     (Regression model 2) 
 
Variable Definitions: SPOS, indicator variable that is equal to 1 if net income scaled by lagged total assets is 
between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise; EM, earnings management measure, defined as the difference between the 
discretionary component of securities gains and losses and the discretionary component of loan loss provisions; 
EBT, earnings before taxes scaled by lagged total assets; AUDIT, dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a bank is 
audited by KPMG, PwC, EY or Deloitte, and 0 otherwise; CAR, ratio of beginning Tier 1 risk adjusted capital; 
DE, ratio of end of year total debt to end of year total common equity; LNTA, natural logarithm of year-end total 
assets; PB, ratio of price to book value of equity indicating growth opportunities. 
 
 
significant unlike Cornett et al. [2009], indicating that well capitalized banks are more 
prone to earnings management. DE is positive related to EM but with a very small 
coefficient (0.0000505). Inconsistent with Cornett et al. [2009] PB has a negative 
coefficient (-0.001623) suggesting that when a bank’s market value is high relative to 
its book value the bank is less likely to have high levels of earnings management. 
Finally, AUDIT and LNTA variables have no statistically significant coefficients. 
 
5.4 Additional sensitivity analysis 
 
We perform two additional tests to check the robustness of our results. First, we rerun 
both our regressions excluding the period 2007-2010. The reason is that 2007 was the 
start of the recent financial crisis and according to DeBoskey and Jiang [2012], 
including this period could possibly skew the outcome. Our results did not change for 
the earnings management regression, but did considerably change for the SPOS  
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Table 6  
OLS regressions of SPOS and earnings management for banks with assets over $1 billion, over the period 
2003-2010. 
Dependend variables SPOS (Model 1) EM (Model 2) 
 
Independend variables 
  
C -749.6172 (-1.068911) 2.216899 (0.530806) 
EBT 2.299240 (0.298975) 0.225249 (3.540539) 
AUDIT -0.308425 (-1.580195) 0.000969 (1.729736) 
CAR 0.051302 (2.314207) 0.000296 (3.635937) 
DE -0.008293 (-0.240990) 0.000358 (2.090924) 
PB -1.076765 (-5.415688) -0.000819 (-1.267215) 
LNTA -0.140043 (-2.272246) -0.000144 (-1.014706) 
   
McFadden / Adjusted R-squared 0.123447 0.172561 
LR / F-statistic 93.97366 10.48092 
 
Notes: Z-statistic and t-statistic are in the parentheses of SPOS and EM, respectively. McFadden R-squared and 
LR statistic address to SPOS variable and Adjusted R-squared F-statistic address to EM variable. All of the 
coefficients have been tested in a 95% confidence interval. 
 
                                       (Regression model 1) 
                                     (Regression model 2) 
 
Variable Definitions: SPOS, indicator variable that is equal to 1 if net income scaled by lagged total assets is 
between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise; EM, earnings management measure, defined as the difference between the 
discretionary component of securities gains and losses and the discretionary component of loan loss provisions; 
EBT, earnings before taxes scaled by lagged total assets; AUDIT, dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a bank is 
audited by KPMG, PwC, EY or Deloitte, and 0 otherwise; CAR, ratio of beginning Tier 1 risk adjusted capital; 
DE, ratio of end of year total debt to end of year total common equity; LNTA, natural logarithm of year-end total 
assets; PB, ratio of price to book value of equity indicating growth opportunities. 
 
 
regression. Earnings before taxes (EBT) as well as the control variables are all 
negatively related to SPOS. This difference can be explained by the fact that during 
the financial crisis many banks recorder large amounts of loan loss provisions to 
cover loan charge-offs (DeBoskey and Jiang [2012]), and engaged in aggressive 
earnings management through the reporting of small positive earnings in order to be 
proven reliable and solvent to the viewers of their financial reports. 
Second, we examine whether our results differ between small and large banks. 
According to Greenawalt and Sinkey [1988] small banks engage to income smoothing 
to a greater extent than large banks. Therefore, we partition our sample into small 
banks and large banks, following the FDICIA Improvement Act of 2005 that 
classifies banks with assets exceeding $1 billion as large banks, and repeat the tests 
for each sub-sample. The results for both sub-samples are similar to the overall 
sample. 
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6. Conclusions, Implications and Recommendations 
For more than two decades academics and practitioners try to deal with the problem 
of earnings management. However, in the recent years, and more specifically, after 
the revelation of accounting fraud scandals by, until then, respectable firms, such as 
Enron, the attention on earnings management has been increased. The empirical 
research on the use of discretionary accruals to manage earnings is extensive 
(DeAngelo [1986, 1988], among others). Earnings management and the low quality of 
financial reporting was the reason for the passage of reforming acts, such as the SOX 
Act. Many prior researches provide evidence on a decline of earnings manipulation 
after the implementation of SOX (Cohen et al. [2004], Zhou [2008], Lobo and Zhou 
[2006]), but this researches focus mostly on non-financial firms. However, empirical 
evidence suggests that the banking industry is more prone to earnings management 
than other industries (Greenawalt and Shinky [1988]). Moreover, the literature on 
earnings management during the recent financial crisis is very limited and focuses on 
European firms (Filip and Raffournier [2012], Berndt and Offenhammer [2010]). 
This study examines earnings management in US listed commercial banks for a 
sample period of 8 years, 2003-2008. The chosen period covers the years that 
followed the enactment of the SOX Act in 2002, and 3 years during the financial 
crisis that started in 2007. Our sample consists of 143 US listed commercial banks. 
The empirical findings suggest that banks continue to employ earnings management 
after the SOX enactment and during the financial crisis. 
Overall, our results show that banks with high earnings before taxes continue to 
manage earnings in the post-SOX era by both recording small positive net income and 
managing loan loss provisions and securities gains and losses. We also find that well-
capitalized and high-leveraged firms are more prone to earnings management than 
their poor-capitalized, low-leveraged counterparts. On the other hand, the results 
suggest that banks with high growth opportunities do not engage in earnings 
management at all, and that banks audited by one of the Big-Four auditing firms avoid 
manipulating earnings by reporting small positive net income. 
These results are robust to our additional sensitivity tests related to the specification 
of the empirical models and the research design used in our study. The empirical 
findings of sensitivity analysis suggest that earnings management behavior based on 
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securities gains and losses and loan loss provisions did not change after the financial 
crisis, but they also reveal a higher frequency of small positive reported net income, 
measured by SPOS, during the same period. Furthermore, the findings indicate that 
the size factor does not affect earnings management in our sample.  
Our contribution to the existing literature is that we demonstrate that earnings 
management still exists within the US banking sector in the post-SOX era and has 
increased during the financial crisis, mainly by high-performance banks. Investors, 
auditors and regulators must be aware of high reported earnings because they could be 
a result of earnings management through discretionary securities gains and losses and 
loan loss provisions, and small “fake” reported net income. 
This study has been conducted under several limitations and, therefore, there are some 
recommendations that could be used in order to extent the present findings and 
improve its validity. Firstly, a larger sample of US listed commercial banks would 
enhance the credibility of the study. Secondly, profitability ratios, such as ROA, or 
other financial ratios could be used as control variables, in order for the models to 
better capture the performance of banks and the discretionary behavior. Additionally, 
the same two models could be used to examine earnings management in other 
countries, which have not yet been studied for earnings management, such as Greece. 
Finally, a larger sample period could be employed to cover several years before and 
after the passage of the SOX Act, in order to be a comparison of earnings 
management in the pre-SOX and post-SOX era.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: Beatty et al. (2002) OLS regression models of loan loss provisions and securities gains and losses 
for a sample of US-listed commercial banks over the period 2003-2010. 
Dependend variables LLP SECGL 
Independend variables   
C 0.007105 (1.675178) 0.002536 (4.777190) 
ALL 0.435567 (4.228278)  
NPL 0.191855 (4.245703)  
REL -0.009504 (-2.489528)  
ICL -0.007786 (-1.845823)  
CIL -0.008591 (-2.058952)  
LNTA 0.000149 (1.223602) -8.49E-05 (-0.601530) 
UNSECGL  -0.001039 (-1.618456) 
   
Adjusted R-squared 0.582566 0.023363 
F-statistic 123.7046 4.038042 
 
Notes: t-statistics are in the parentheses of LLP and SECGL. All of the coefficients have been tested in a 95% 
confidence interval. 
 
                                                                
                                      
 
Variable Definitions: LLP, loan loss provisions scaled by total loans; ALLP, beginning balance of allowance for 
loan losses scaled by total loans; NPL, non-performing loans scaled by total loans; REL, real-estate loans scaled by 
total loans; CIL, commercial and industrial loans scaled by total loans; ICL, installment and consumer loans scaled 
by total loans; SECGL, realized securities gains and losses scaled by total loans;  LNTA, natural logarithm of year-
end total assets; PB, ratio of price to book value of equity indicating growth opportunities; UNSECGL, unrealized 
securities gains and losses scaled by total loans.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
